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NOTES
Vested Rights in the Runaway Shop
When the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
rendered its decision on March 28, 1961 in Zdanok v. Glidden Com-
pany,' the controversial subject of the "runaway shop"' was revived 3
Three decades ago this problem was of slight importance because
few plants sought to relocate." But with the onset of the depression,
the intensification of competition, and the great strides forward in unioni-
zation, certain industries in which the ratio of labor costs to the total cost
of processing was high began to move their plants southward.5
In recent years an increasing number of employers have been relocat-
ing their plants. They are moving to smaller communities in the Mid-
west, the South, and along the Pacific Coast. The movement has been
mainly from the large industrial centers of New York, Detroit, Pitts-
burgh, Philadelphia, the Newark-Jersey City area, and upper New York
State.6 The economic repercussion upon these Northern communities
is evident.'
There is a basic conflict between the employer's need to be free to
locate his operations to his economic advantage and labor's need for
security of employment.
The primary motivation of the employer in dosing his plant and
moving to a new location is lower costs. Employers are attracted by the
prospects of lower wages, non-union employees, and the absence of re-
strictive work practices.' Other reasons given by businessmen for the
1. 288 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1961). A divided court held that seniority rights acquired by em-
ployees under terms of a union contract became vested in the employees and survived termina-
tion of the contract.
2. This term is used in labor parlance meaning the relocating of a plant as an anti-union tactic.
3. See U.S. News & World Report, Aug. 7, 1961, p. 81.
4. Between 1929 and 1933 less than 36/100 of one percent of all industry in the United
States relocated its plants. The removals which did occur were primarily in New England,
the Middle Atlantic, and North Central regions. CREAMER, IS INDUSTRY DECENTRALIZNG?
55, 60 (1935).
5. For a complete discussion of the problem during this period see, Note, Legal Problems
Raised by the Relocation of Industry: The Runaway Shop, 36 COLuM. L. Rnv. 776 (1936).
During the war years and the period immediately thereafter, there were relatively few plant
relocations.
6. U.S. News & World Report, Dec. 21, 1959, p. 89.
7. The main harms to the community are that more workers are cast into the ranks of the
unemployed; the purchasing power of the consumer-worker is substantially diminshed; addi-
tional burdens are placed upon the local welfare agencies. The repercussions are far greater
when a large plant in a relatively small community is relocated.
8. U.S. News & World Report, Aug. 7, 1961, p. 81. Some Southern states have passed
right-to-work laws and have given cities, counties, and townships the right to waive taxes up to
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removal of a plant are: larger factory sites, lower plant overhead, and
lower transportation costs? In addition, municipal authorities in com-
munities with a high incidence of unemployment often will make sub-
stantial tax concessions to any company that will open a plant within
its city limits."0 Sometimes they will even arrange for private financing
of the relocated plant.
Labor organizations, on the other hand, are motivated by two basic
reasons for blocking this migration to non-union communities: first, the
union wants to maintain its status as the certified bargaining representa-
tive for the particular company's employees; second, it desires to protect
the job of the individual union member. Unions maintain that the re-
located company leaves to fend for themselves workers who are too old
to learn another trade or to secure another job. Such individuals find
themselves stranded by the enterprise to which they have "dedicated their
best productive years.""
This note will consider the evolution of the different theories which
unions and employees have resorted to in combating the "runaway shop."
There have been (1) actions in the state courts for breach of the col-
lective bargaining agreement; (2) charges of unfair labor practices filed
with the National Labor Relations Board; (3) suits in federal courts un-
der section 301 (a)' 2 of the Taft-Hartley Act for breach of contract; and
(4) actions in federal courts based upon employees' "vested rights."
Both unions and individual employees have standing in "runaway
shop" situations to institute litigation in state courts or to file unfair labor
practice charges with the NLRB. The right to seek relief under section
301 (a) belongs exclusively to labor unions while only individual em-
ployees have standing to bring an action in the federal courts based upon
a "vested rights" concept.
Commencement of such litigation has occurred before, during, and
after plant relocation, depending on the nature of each particular case.
Remedies obtained have been in the form of damages, injunctive relief
against plant movement, and the declaration of a right to a job in the
relocated plant.
a ten-year period for industries that move South. Cleveland Plain Dealer, Aug. 18, 1961,
p. 37, col 4.
9. U.S. News & World Report, Dec. 21, 1959, p. 90.
10. Commonweal, Sept. 29, 1961, p. 4. Such efforts have been undertaken on the part of
certain communities in Southern states. See Saturday Evening Post, April 9, 1960, p. 10. As
an example, the town of Grenada, Mississippi, offered tax concessions to a Detroit firm if the
company agreed to staff its new plant with local people. U.S. News & World Report, Aug. 7,
1961, p. 81.
11. Commonweal, Sept. 22, 1961, p. 4.
12. 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C.§ 185(a) (1958). See note 57 infra for the full pro-
visions of section 301 (a).
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ACTIONS IN THE STATE COURTS
Prior to the enactment of the National Labor Relations Acte' unions
sought relief in the state courts when an employer removed his plant in
violation of the specific terms of a collective agreement. There is a
scarcity of decisions, however, in this area. The leading case is Dubin-
sky v. Blue Dale Dress Company, 4 in which a New York court issued
an injunction ordering the defendant-company to return its plant from
Archbald, Pennsylvania, to New York City, and to rehire its discharged
workers. 5 Another New York court held that a union may enjoin an
employer from moving his plant to a new location when the object of
the removal is to avoid the obligations of a collective agreement.'
Where state courts have refused to enjoin the removal of a plant, the
decisions are generally based on the equities involved in the particular
case.'
7
There were no reported state court decisions awarding damages for
breach of a collective agreement in a "runaway shop" situation until
1935.18 Then, in Farulla v. Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc.,9 the court in
addition to granting a permanent injunction, said that "concededly the
plaintiff is entitled to damages."2  The court thereupon appointed a
referee to ascertain the amount of damages. It did not, however, indicate
what the measure of damages should be.
Since the passage of the NLRA and subsequent labor legislation,
there has been a dearth of state court cases on the subject of the "run-
away shop." The reasons for this are, first, that the removal of a plant
for the purpose of evading obligations imposed by the NLRA is an unfair
labor practice,2 ' and second, that state courts are generally without juris-
diction to grant relief with respect to an alleged unfair labor practice
13. 49 Stat. 449-57 (1935), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-67 (1958).
14. 162 Misc. 177, 292 N.Y. Supp. 89 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
15. The court expanded on the rule laid down in Farulla v. Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc., 155
Misc. 262, 279 N.Y. Supp. 228 (Sup. Ct. 1935), in which the court had merely threatened
to order the defendant-company to return the plant from its new location.
16. Farulla v. Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc., 155 Misc. 262, 279 N.Y. Supp. 228 (Sup. Ct.
1935).
17. In Goldman v. Cohen, 222 App. Div. 631, 227 N.Y. Supp. 311 (1928), the union was
denied equitable relief enjoining the violation of an agreement when the old company went
out of business and a new company was established elsewhere. See also Berry v. Old
South Engraving Co., 283 Mass. 441, 186 N.E. 601 (1933). Contra, Goldman v. Rosenszweig,
10 Law & Labor 207 (N.Y. Ct. 1928).
18. Rice, Collective Labor Agreements in American Law, 44 HARv. L. REv. 572 (1931).
The one exception was when the agreement formed part of an individual contract of em-
ployment.
"19. 155 Misc. 262, 279 N.Y. Supp 228 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
20. Id. at 288, 279 N.Y. Supp. at 256.
21. See pp. 365-66 infra.
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because an appropriate administrative remedy is afforded by the National
Labor Relations Board.22
This area of the law was complicated, however, by the creation by
the NLRB of certain jurisdictional "yardsticks" which it applied to cases
involving activities prohibited or protected by the NLRA.2 If these
standards were not met, the Board would then refuse to hear the unfair
labor practice charge. Thus all disputes in which the NLRB had author-
ity but declined to exercise it, fell into a "no-man's land" in which neither
federal nor state law could be applied.
In order to rectify this situation Congress included in the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, section 701,2' which
amended section 14 of the NLRA and provided that cases which do not
meet the NLRB's jurisdictional yardsticks can be determined by state
courts. This eliminated the former "no-man's land" so that today it may
be possible to bring suits for damages or injunctive relief in "runaway
shop" situations in the state courts. As yet no such cases have been
reported.
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE UNDER NLRA
Section 72" of the National Labor Relations Act gave employees the
right to self-organization, to form or join a union, and to bargain col-
lectively through their designated representatives. To assure these rights
the act declared that it was an unfair labor practice under section 8 (a)
(1)" for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce an employee
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7, and similarly under
section 8(a) (3) 27 for an employer to discriminate in regard to the
hiring of employees or tenure of employment or any term or condition
of employment, or to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization. It was also an unfair labor practice under 8(a) (5)28 for
an employer to refuse to bargain in good faith. The act established the
National Labor Relations Board, which was empowered to hold hearings
and to render decisions after unfair labor practice charges were filed. 9
22. Devries v. Baumgartneis Elec. Constr. Co., 359 U.S. 498 (1959); Weber v. Anheuser-
Busch, Inc., 348 U.. 468 (1955); Garner v. Teamsters' Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1955).
23. These jurisdictional yardsticks are really jurisdictional standards. The NLRB will exer-
cise its jurisdiction when the enterprise involved does business in an amount greater than cer-
tain prescribed minimums. For a further discussion see LABOR RELATIONS AND THE LAW
112-13 (Wollet & Aaron ed., 2d ed. 1960).
24. 73 Star. 541, 29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (Supp. II 1960). This section is discussed in Aaron,
The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1086, 1086-98
(1960).
25. 49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958).
26. 49 Stat 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1958).
27. 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (Supp. II 1960).
28. 49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1958).
29. 49 Sta. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1958).
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Thus when confronted with "runaway shop" situations, unions turned
to the NLRB, alleging violations of section 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (3). The
unions have charged that threats to relocate as well as actual relocation
amount to unfair labor practices in violation of the NLRA.
Threat to Relocate
An employer who threatens to move his plant from one town to an-
other if his employees become unionized is in violation of section 8 (a)
(1). An order to cease and desist from interference with the union's
organizational activities has been the usual remedy.3" Where a company
uses other tactics to defeat a union's attempt to organize, such as circulat-
ing rumors among local businessmen regarding plant removal so as to
create a fear of economic starvation and an atmosphere of anti-unionism,
this also has been held to be an unfair labor practice."'
It is an unfair labor practice for a company owner to threaten to
move his factory elsewhere unless a company-dominated union was se-
lected to replace the incumbent union. 2 The Board has even held that
a threat to relocate when uttered by a company supervisor to an indi-
vidual employee during the course of a discussion concerning the em-
ployee's union activities was calculated to intimidate her activities on be-
half of a union and was therefore an unfair labor practice. 8 An order
directing the employer to cease and desist from future threats and to
publicly announce his withdrawal of the threat is usually rendered in
these situations.84
A statement indicating an intent to relocate, when made by company
officials not for the purpose of injuring a union, but motivated by the
company's weakened financial condition, is not an unfair labor practice. 5
Thus in Lengel-Fencil Cornpany the Board found that since the em-
ployer's "threats" to move were motivated exclusively by the company's
financial condition the unfair labor practice charge could not be upheld.36
Support for this finding was found in the company's financial records.
30. NLRB v. Nina Dye Works, Inc., 203 F.2d 849 (3d Cir. 1953); NLRB v. Mayer, 196 F.2d
286 (5th Cir. 1952); Jasper Blackburn Prods. Corp., 21 N.L.R.B. 1240 (1940).
31. Remington-Rand, Inc., 4 N.LR.B. 626 (1937). See also Lennox Shoe Co., 4 N.L.R.B.
372 (1937), where the owner threatened local businessmen and induced them not to extend
credit to company employees unless they joined the company indorsed union.
32. Sanco Piece Dye Works, Inc., 38 N.L.R.B. 690 (1942); Ansin Shoe Mfg. Co., 9 N.L.R.B.
929 (1936).
33. H. Linsk & Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 276 (1945). See also Irving Air Chute Co., 52 N.L.R.B.
201 (1943). An employer called an employee away from work to tell him that an official of
the company had said that he would move the plant before he would see the union become
established.
34. Irving Air Chute Co., 52 N.L.R.B. 201 (1943).
35. Lengel-Fencil Co., 8 N.L.R.B. 988 (1938).
36. Id. at 995.
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For an eight-year period prior to the filing of the unfair labor practice
charge in 1938, the company annually operated at a substantial loss, ex-
cept in 1934 and 1935.
In NLRB v. Reynolds Pen Company," the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit held that a speech to employees containing a veiled threat
to move the plant if trouble continued could not sustain the Board's find-
ing of an unfair labor practice. This result was achieved by application
of the "substantial evidence" rule. This rule is generally used today as
a test for determining whether an NLRB order will be enforced by a
court of appeals38
Actual Relocation
In addition to threatening to move elsewhere, some companies have
made their threats a reality by relocating their entire plants to other com-
munities. It was found that some employers moved in order to avoid
the necessity of dealing with the certified representatives of their em-
ployees;"9 others sought to evade the obligations imposed by written
agreements.4
In Rome Products Company41 the employer moved his plant in great
haste from Akron to Kenton, Ohio in order to avoid dealing with a union
whose selection as the certified representative of Rome's employees the
employer had opposed. The NLRB found this action to be an unfair
labor practice under sections 8(a) (3) and 8(a) (5) of the NLRA.
There was an 8 (a) (3) violation because the plant removal resulted in a
discriminatory discharge of the employees. Section 8(a) (5) was vio-
lated because the removal was in effect a method of avoiding the require-
ment to bargain in good faith. Prior to the Rome case the Board had
rendered a similar decision in Schieber Millinery Company.42 Here the
Board found that an employer had moved his millinery plant from St.
37. 162 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1947). See also NIRB v. Lion Shoe Co., 97 F.2d 448 (1st Cir.
1938), where evidence was held insuffident to support the Board's finding of an unfair
labor practice.
38. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). Employers have even caused
their factories to be shut down for a period of time in order to increase the effect of a threat
to relocate. See Jac Feinberg Hosiery Mills, 19 N.LR.B. 667 (1940); Omaha Hat Corp.,
4 NJ.R.B. 878 (1938). A related problem which is beyond the scope of this note arises
when management threatens to close its plant. See, e.g., NLRB v. Armstrong Tire & Rubber
Co., 228 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1955); NLRB v. West Coast Casket Co., 205 F.2d 909 (9th Cir.
1953); Stokley v. NLRB, 193 F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1952).
39. Rome Prods. Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1217 (1948).
40. Schieber Millinery Co., 26 N.LR.B. 937 (1940); Jacob H. Klotz, 13 N-L.R.B. 746
(1939).
41. 77 N.L.R.B. 1217 (1948). The Board ordered the company to reinstate the discharged
employees at the Kenton plant and to pay for the transportation expenses incurred in moving
the employees and their households to the new locale.
42. 26 N.L.R.B. 937 (1940).
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Louis to DeSota, Missouri, in order to evade certain contractual obliga-
tions, that of hiring union employees, and to avoid the duty of bargain-
ing collectively with the union's representatives.
The power of the NLRB to order affirmative action, as well as to
render cease and desist orders as remedies for unfair labor practices, is
well settled.4" In framing its remedial orders the Board is limited how-
ever by the principle of reasonableness; it may not impose penalties or
exact retribution.44 When a plant relocation is held to be an unfair labor
practice, the NLRB will usually issue an alternative order, by which the
employer will have the choice of either returning the plant to the point
from which it was removed or of reinstating the employees with back
wages at the new plant (paying them the reasonable expenses entailed in
moving to the new site)."' Sometimes the company will be ordered to
pay the cost of transporting its employee's household effects as well.4
The Board has never unconditionally ordered an employer found guilty
of a "runaway shop" violation to return the plant to its former location.
It has always issued an alternative order of the type just described."
Instead of relocating an entire plant, employers have sometimes
moved part of their operations from one plant to another, in order to
avoid dealing with the union representing employees in those jobs. The
Board has held that such activities violate sections 8(a) (1) and 8(a)
(M).48 Removal of the bulk of a company's business from one city to
another has been viewed by the NLRB in the same light as the removal
of the entire plant.4"
43. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7 (1940).
44. Id. at 12.
45. New Madrid Mfg. Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 117 (1953); Schieber Millinery Co., 26 N.L.R.B.
937 (1940). Where the new location is within commuting distance the Board may offer the
company the choice of paying for the employees' expenses in moving, or for transportation bi-
weekly from the plant to their homes for visits with their families. Jacob H. Klotz, 13 N.L.R.B.
746 (1939).
46. New Madrid Mfg. Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 117 (1953).
47. Often the Board will, in addition, order the employer to bargain collectively with the
union, assuming that it represents a majority of the workers at the relocated plant. Mount
Hope Finishing Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 480 (1953); Fiss Corp., 43 N.L.R.B. 125 (1942), en-
forced, 136 F.2d 990 (3d Cir. 1943).
48. Winchester Electronics, Inc., 128 N.L.R.B. 1292 (1960); Treadway & Taylor, 109 N.L.-
R.B. 1045 (1954).
49. See Gerity Whitaker Co., 33 N.L.R.B. 393 (1941), enforced, 137 F.2d 198 (6th Cir.
1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 801 (1943). Employers have also been known to form new
companies or to sell their businesses in an attempt to avoid complying with their statutory or
contractual obligations. Note, The Effect of Relocation or Sale of Industry Upon Labor-Man-
agement Relations, 5 WEST. RES. L. REv. 84 (1953). The alter ego concept is discussed in
NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961).
In NLRB v. Lewis, 246 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1957), a partnership moved its plant eleven
miles across the city of Los Angeles and formed a new company in order to avoid bargaining
with a union.
[Vol 13:2
Runaway Shop
Relocation for Economic Reasons
All changes in plant location are not unlawful. Where the reloca-
tion is based primarily upon sound financial or economic reasons there
is no unfair labor practice." Thus in Mount Hope Finishing Company
v. NLRB,5 a court of appeals held that there were sufficient economic
reasons for moving a textile plant from Massachusetts to North Carolina.
Among the considerations which the court relied upon were: the former
plant operated at a loss; the employer had contemplated a change long
before the local union began to organize its employees; other textile com-
panies had changed localities under similar circumstances.
The law is unsettled in the situation where there are both discrimina-
tory and economic reasons for moving. It was stated as dictum in NLRB
v. Remington Rand, Inc., 2 however, that if there are valid economic
reasons for moving as well as discriminatory reasons, and the real reason
is within the knowledge of the employer alone, a presumption arises that
the plant was removed for a discriminatory purpose.
The NLRB has been rather reluctant to accept employers' conten-
tions that plant relocations are necessitated primarily by economic factors.
Nevertheless it has held that the movement of a plant because of high
rentals and cost of operation, as well as other economic considerations, is
not an unfair labor practice.5" The Board seems to have established a
good faith test in these plant removal situations. The employer who is
attempting to show that the relocation was lawful must establish facts
to prove that the act of removal was made in good faith and without any
intent to evade those statutory duties owed to the union or its members.5
Although the NLRB has never considered the question, it seems likely
that the Board would view a plant removal in derogation of an agreement
as an unfair labor practice, regardless of the fact that it was based upon
50. Mount Hope Finishing Co. v. NLRB, 211 F.2d 365 (4th Cir. 1954); Trenton Garment
Co., 4 N.L.R.B. 1186 (1938). Similarly where a change or discontinuance of business opera-
tions is dictated by sound financial or economic reasons, the courts have refused to enforce
a finding that section 8(a) (3) has been violated. NLRB v. Lassing, 284 F.2d 781 (6th
Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 909 (1961); NLRB v. R. C. Mahon Co., 269 F.2d 44 (6th
Cir. 1959); NLRB v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 211 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1954).
51. 211 F.2d 365 (4th Cir. 1954). The NLRB had petitioned the federal court for en-
forcement of its orders, as it is empowered to do under section 10(e) of the National Labor
Relations Act.
52. 94 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 576 (1938).
53. Brown Truck & Trailer Co., Inc., 106 N.LR.B. 999 (1953); Trenton Garment Co., 4
N.LR.B. 1186 (1938).
54. See Kipbea Baking Co., 1961 CCH N.LR.B. 5 9939; Administrative Decision of NLRB
General Counsel, Case No. K-348 (1956). In Kipbea the Board based its decision on the
fact that the union and its members had more than adequate notice of the removal of the
business. There were also economic and personal financial reasons for changing the locale.
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sound economic reasons.55 There is support for this opinion in the Board's
decision in the Schieber case.
SUITS UNDER SECTION 301 (a) OF THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT
Although labor organizations and employees still file unfair labor
practice charges with the NLRB in "runaway shop" situations,5" the
unions have more often sought relief under a different theory in recent
years. Actions have been brought in the federal district courts for breach
of the collective bargaining agreement under section 301 (a) of the Taft-
Hartley Act.57 Unions have chosen to exercise this statutory right rather
than file an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB, apparently for
the following reasons: damages and injunctive relief are available through
301 (a) suits while no such relief can be granted by the NLRB; the
defense of economic motivation is not available in breach of contract
suits.
As in all breach of contract suits the courts have been required to
consider the right of the complaining party to maintain the suit under
section 301 (a). It is a general rule that the Taft-Hartley Act permits
unions alone to sue to enforce union rights. They may not sue on behalf
of their members where no union right is involved."8 Thus neither
employees nor union members have the right to sue for breach of a col-
lective agreement under section 301 (a)." Joinder of a union's and
55. A second question arises, whether a company's failure to submit the subject of plant
removal to collective bargaining is a refusal to bargain with respect to rates of pay, hours, and
working conditions and therefore in violation of 8(a) (5). The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit answered this question in NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170 (2d
Cir. 1961). It held that the decision to relocate is not a subject of collective bargaining, but
once the decision is made the company is required to give notice to the union and to afford
the union an opportunity to bargain as to the treatment due to the affected employees. If no
such notice is given, then the company may be found guilty of an unfair labor practice under
section 8(a) (5). Apparently, the Board has never considered the problem where a com-
pany refuses to negotiate on the subject of employee treatment after notice of plant removal
has been given.
56. NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961); Kipbea Baking Co., 1961
CCH N.L.R.B. 5 9939.
57. 61 Star. 156 (1947), 29U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958). This section states: "Suits for viola-
tion of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an
industry affecting commerce as defined in the Act, or between any such labor organizations
may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties,
without respect to the amount in controversy or regard to the citizenship of the parties."
58. Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S.
437 (1955).
59. Electrical Workers, Local 506 v. General Elec. Co., 231 F.2d 259 (D.C. Cit. 1956).
See Local Lodge 2040 v. Servel, Inc., 268 F.2d 692, 696 (1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884
(1959). Here an action was brought by two unions and a large number of defendant-com-
pany's employees for a declaratory judgment. The unions invoked the district court's juris-
diction under section 301 (a). The employees asserted jurisdiction based upon diversity of
citizenship. The district court, relying on the Westinghouse case, dismissed the complaint
as to the unions for want of jurisdiction. See note 58 supra. It granted summary judgment
for the defendant as to the employees' complaint.
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individual employees' causes of action where the employees' claims con-
stitute separate non-federal causes of action is not permitted."0
There is also a question of whether the federal district courts have
original jurisdiction to hear "runaway shop" cases brought under section
301 (a). The Connecticut District Court, feeling itself bound by the
Supreme Court's decision in Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,61 declined
jurisdiction in a suit under section 301 (a) on the ground that exclusive
primary jurisdiction is in the NLRB. 2 This court's conclusion has no
legal support since the Supreme Court had merely stated in Weber that
the NLRB has jurisdiction to the exclusion of a state court when the
facts reasonably bring the controversy within that section of the NLRA
prohibiting unfair labor practices. It never held that the Board had
original jurisdiction in "runaway shop" situations to the exclusion of
the federal district courts. Since other federal district courts63 have taken
jurisdiction in suits for runaway shops under section 301 (a), it appears
that this question is now resolved.0 4
Upon analysis of the decisions rendered there is a strong indication
that the question of whether the removal of a plant constitutes a breach
of contract depends, as in the state courts, upon the specific language of
the collective bargaining agreement involved. The leading case is United
Shoe ;Workers of America v. Brooks Shoe Manufacturing Company."
Here the collective bargaining agreement entered into by the parties
contained a provision forbidding the removal of the manufacturing opera-
tion from Philadelphia for any reason during the life of the contract.
Before the termination date, the company moved its plant from Phila-
delphia to Hanover, Pennsylvania. The court awarded damages to the
plaintiff-union, stating that there was an express violation of the existing
agreement by the company.
In United Automobile Workers v. Crescent Brass & Pin Company,"
the defendant had decided upon a plan to move its Detroit plant to
Americus, Georgia. Thus a federal court was confronted with a question
60. United Shoe Workers of America v. Brooks Shoe Co., 191 F. Supp. 288 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
61. 348 U.S. 593 (1955).
62. Auto Workers, Local 586 v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co., 28 CCH Lab. Cas. 5 69274 (D. Conn.
1955). There is interesting dictum in this decision to the effect that seniority and pension
rights are protected by the contract, but are based on continuation of plant operation and em-
ployment of the workers. See contrary position, p. 374 infra.
63. Jurisdiction has been invoked in United Shoe Workers of America v. Brooks Shoe Co.,
187 F. Supp. 509 (E.D. Pa. 1960); Automobile Workers v. Crescent Brass & Pin Co., 41
CCH Lab. Cas J 16530 (E.D. Mich. 1960); Carpenters Union v. International Paper Co., 40
CCH Lab. Cas. 5 66777 (D. Ore. 1960).
64. In Textile Workers v. Arista Mills Co., 193 F.2d 529 (4th Cir. 1951), the court said
that there is no reason why union rights may not be enforced under section 301 even though
the breach of contract may also constitute an unfair labor practice.
65. 187 F. Supp. 509 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
66. 41 CCH Lab. Cas. 5 16530 (E.D. Mich. 1960).
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different from that raised in Brooks Shoe. In determining whether a
mere decision to move constituted a breach of the existing contract, the
court looked to the specific language of the contract involved. The
agreement contained a clause 7 which anticipated a plant removal. The
company was willing to offer its employees the opportunity to transfer
to the relocated plant, but it was unwilling to continue the contract in
effect in Georgia, in direct violation of a contract provision. The federal
district court issued a preliminary injunction stating that the clause in
the collective bargaining agreement gave the unions the dear right to
have the contract in effect should the company move to Georgia.6" The
court reasoned that the rule announced in Association of Westinghouse
Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation69 applied here.
This rule permits unions to sue under section 301 (a) to enforce rights
which are theirs as unions under a collective bargaining agreement.
In the absence of a specific contractual provision regarding plant re-
moval, this writer is uncertain as to what decisions the federal courts will
reach in future breach of contract suits brought under 301 (a). The case
law indicates that the courts have not developed as yet any particular
standards for deciding such litigation.
It has been held that an employer can not terminate unilaterally a
collective bargaining agreement by moving his plant from East Orange
to Pennsauken, New Jersey."0 Here the company argued that "a move
on its part brought the contract with the plaintiff-union to an end"'"
since the contract applied only to the activities of the employer in East
Orange, New Jersey. This argument was rejected by the court even
though there was no provision regarding plant removal in the contract."2
The contract extended beyond the company's activities at East Orange.
When the contractual language does not specify any provisions re-,
garding plant relocation, a court, in determining the legality of a plant
removal, will usually look to the facts in each case and particularly to
the employer's motivation for moving. But such a determination may
be unnecessary because the union has bargained away its right to object
to the plant relocation. For example, in Carpenters, Local 2524 v. Inter-
67. Article XVI, section 11 stated: "In event that plant and/or any of its operations are
moved, or the name is changed by any of the owners, this contract shall continue in effect until
its termination date and all employees shall be offered an opportunity to transfer also..."
68. The contract also contained a union shop provision. The court said that this provision
in the agreement would not be in effect should the company move to Georgia because Georgia
prohibits the union shop.
69. 348 U.S. 437 (1955).
70. Metal Polishers, Local 44 v. Viking Equip. Co., 278 F.2d 142 (3rd Cir. 1960).
71. Ibid.
72. The district court had accepted the company's argument and denied the injunction which
the union had sought.
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national Paper Companj the union and the company entered into an
agreement separate from the collective bargaining agreement. The parties
recognized in this separate agreement that: (1) the plant would cease
operations at some future unspecified date; (2) the employer regarded
the existing collective bargaining agreement as not applicable at the new
plant location; and (3) these facts had been known to the union for
more than one year. The court granted summary judgment to the em-
ployer in this suit for breach of contract.
Remedies Under Section 301(a)
The Supreme Court concluded in Textile Workers of America v. Lin-
coln Mills of Alabama4 that in suits brought under section 301 (a) the
substantive law to be applied is federal law, which the courts must fashion
in accordance with the policy of our national labor laws.75 The Court
stated that the lower federal courts must look at the policy of this legisla-
tion and fashion a remedy which will effectuate that policy."
In almost every "runaway shop" suit brought under section 301 (a)
the union has sought damages and injunctive relief. This was the prayer
in the Brooks Shoe7 case, but the remedy devised was a rather unusual
one. The federal district court first considered the remedies which the
NLRB has used in "runaway shop" situations.78 The court found that it
would be an unwarranted hardship to order the company to return to
Philadelphia and that to order the company to offer jobs in Hanover with
transportation expenses would be impractical. Thereupon the court
projected into the future the status quo of the parties as they were at the
time of the breach. It determined what the probable loss in union dues
would be, from the time of the breach, for a period of twenty years. This
sum was then awarded to the union as compensatory damages. The
court also stated that since section 301 (a) neither provided for nor pro-
hibited the imposition of punitive damages, it would award them to the
union in the amount of $50,000. In discussing these punitive damages,
the court reasoned that the company had knowingly and willfully violated
the national labor policy which had been fashioned by Congress and been
applied by the NLRB."h Such relief in effect punished the company for
73. 40 CCH Lab. Cas. 9 66777 (D. Ore. 1960).
74. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
75. Id. at 456.
76. ibid.
77. United Shoe Workers v. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., 187 F. Supp. 509 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
78. See p. 366 supra.
79. The district court admitted that the issue of punitive damages had not been raised or
ruled on in any case brought under section 301 (a). But it said that punitive damages had
been awarded under a similar provision (section 303) of the act. The case referred to was
United Mine Workers of America v. Meadow Creek Coal Co., 263 F.2d 56 (6th Cir. 1959).
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1013 (1959).
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its actions, but the discharged employees received no direct benefit from
this award. The damages were awarded to the union alone.
In the situation where an employer decides to move his plant and
repudiate a collective bargaining agreement in express violation of the
contract's provisions, a preliminary injunction has been granted restrain-
ing the employer from refusing to keep the contract in effect until its
expiration date."0 It has been reasoned that in such instances the grant-
ing of the injunction will cause the employer little harm, while there
would be irreparable injury to the plaintiff if it were not issued.
Recent developments in this area may well change the type of remedy
fashioned by the courts in "runaway shop" suits brought under section
301 (a).
ACTIONS BASED UPON THE VESTED RIGHTS THEORY
The federal courts have ordered employers to pay damages to unions
for breach of collective bargaining agreements when plant removal was
specifically prohibited therein. And an employer has been enjoined from
unilaterally terminating an agreement after the relocation of his plant,
but before the contract's termination date. But the most grievous blow
which a court has dealt to an employer in a "runaway shop" situation is
the vested rights doctrine which was recently announced in the case of
Zdanok v. Glidden Company."1 This appears to be a landmark decision.
The question here was whether employees' seniority rights survived
both the life of the collective bargaining agreement and the change in the
physical location of the plant. This question was answered in the nega-
tive by the federal district court,' but that decision was reversed by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.8"
The Glidden Company, Durkee Fine Foods Division, had operated a
plant at Elmhurst, New York for approximately eighteen years. Local
852, of which plaintiffs were members, had been a party to collective
bargaining agreements with Glidden since 1949. The last agreement was
to expire on November 30, 1957. In May, 1957 the company notified
the union that its operations would be discontinued "in several months."
It then began to reduce production at its Elmhurst plant and to remove
equipment to the new plant in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. In compliance
80. Automobile Workers v. Crescent Brass & Pin Co., 41 CCH Lab. Cas. 5 16530 (E.D.
Mich. 1960).
81. 288 F.2d 99 (2d Cit. 1961).
82. Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 185 F. Supp. 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
83. Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 288 F.2d 99 (2d Cit. 1961). The petition for writ of
certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court in all respects except on one question:
Whether the participation of a United States Court of Claims Judge vitiates the judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals? See 30 U.S.L. WEEK 3112 (Oct. 10, 1961).
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with the contract terms, Glidden notified the union on September 16 that
the contract would not be renewed upon its expiration date.
Upon termination of the agreement the company discharged its em-
ployees. It did not offer the plaintiffs continued employment at its new
plant with retention of the seniority rights acquired at Elmhurst, but it
did offer to receive applications at the Bethlehem plant from former Elm-
hurst employees. In 1958 certain former employees sued in a New
York state court to recover damages for the alleged breach of contract.'
The company petitioned for removal to the federal district court upon a
diversity of citizenship ground. Removal was granted. It should be
noted that the district court's power to proceed under section 301 (a)
was not invoked" and the plaintiffs' standing to sue was not in issue."6
Argument of Parties
The employees conceded that there was no express provision prohibit-
ing plant removal at the termination of the agreement. But they con-
tended that there was an implied condition of the bargain between the
union and the company that seniority rights created by the contract would
survive the termination date. The employees maintained that the con-
tract provided that in cases of layoffs, the seniority of employees with
more than five years service was not to terminate until there was a three-
year continual layoff. They argued that the termination of employment
was in effect a layoff due to curtailment of production, and claimed that
their accrued three-year seniority rights entitled them to resume work
when operations commenced at Bethlehem. To meet its obligations, the
union requested that the Glidden Company be required to offer the
plaintiffs employment at Bethlehem to which seniority status at Elm-
hurst would attach."
84. Prior to the suit in the state court, the company had made a motion in the Supreme Court
of New York, Queens County, to stay arbitration proceedings sought by the union. The
company argued that the disputes were not arbitrable under the arbitration clause of the col-
lective bargaining agreement. The court granted the motion saying, "No provision was made in
the collective agreement relating to the continuance or discontinuance of operations at Elmhurst;
for the continuance of employment of the employees covered by said agreement for any period
of time other than the expiration date thereof, nor requiring the company to offer to each
employee continued employment with full seniority in event of discontinuance." Such union
disputes are referable to arbitration under a clause which requires arbitration only when the
"specific terms" of the collective agreement are involved. Matter of General Warehousemen's
Union, 10 Misc. 2d 700, 705, 172 N.Y.S.2d 678, 683 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
The question of res judicata was raised by the Glidden Company in the district court and in
the court of appeals. The appellate court denied the company's contention. Zdanok v. Glid-
den Co., 288 F.2d 99, 101 (2d Cir. 1961).
85. Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 185 F. Supp. 441, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
86. The district court relied on Local Lodge 2040 v. Servel, Inc., 268 F.2d 692, 696 (7th
Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1961), in stating that the plaintiffs had standing as
beneficiaries of a collective agreement to enforce provisions made for their benefit. The court
of appeals was in agreement but relied upon Parker v. Borock, 5 N.Y.2d 156, 156 N.E.2d 297
(1959).
87. Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 185 F. Supp. 441, 443-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
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The company, on the other hand, argued that no implied understand-
ing concerning survival of seniority rights could be drawn from the terms
of the agreement or prior relationship. The implication that such rights
were designed to outlive the life of the plant and the agreement were
without foundation. They ceased upon cessation of operations and law-
ful termination of the agreement.8
The critical issue before the district court was whether the employees'
rights attached beyond the Elmhurst plant. The court of appeals dis-
agreed with the district court's negative answer.89 In so doing, the court
gave a very liberal interpretation to the preamble of the collective bar-
gaining agreement. The preamble stated that the contract was made
by the company on behalf of its plant facilities "located at Corona Avenue
and 94th St., Elmhurst, New York." By its "rational construction" of
the contract the court held that "the statement of location was nothing
more than a reference to the existing situation and had none of the
vital significance which the defendants would attach to it."9  The fact
that the plant was moved to a city in another state did not seem de-
cisive to this court.9
The court's "rational" interpretation of the collective bargaining agree-
ment was made without support from any semblance of authority. One
might question how many courts in interpreting collective bargaining agree-
ments would state, "Contracts must, in all fairness, be construed, ut res
magis valeat quaa pereat."92
The crux of this decision lies in the court's discussion of employees'
rights. The court reiterated the fact that at the time of discharge those
employees who had reached the age of sixty-five and who qualified under
the contract had been placed on the company's retired list and received
retirement pay. Similarly, those employees with fifteen years service, who
had reached the age of forty-five at the time of discharge, were told by
the company that they had vested rights to retirement benefits and
would begin to receive them when they reached sixty-five. The court
reasoned that these rights, although they were solely dependent upon the
agreement, had been treated as "vested rights" and honored by the com-
pany. These rights had been earned by compliance with the contract.
By the same token, the court decided that the employees had "'earned'
their valuable unemployment insurance, and their rights in it were
88. Id. at 444.
89. Id. at 447. The district court said that where no relevant limitation of the employer's free-
dom of action is found in the agreement or from prior conduct, no policy of New York law or
national labor laws requires the employer to preserve for its employees seniority status acquired
under an expired agreement covering a closed plant.
90. Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 288 F.2d 99, 104 (2d Cit. 1961).
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid. "That the thing may rather have effect than be destroyed."
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'vested' and could not be unilaterally annulled."93 Since the court adopted
this viewpoint, it was logical for it to hold by analogy that the discharged
employees were entitled to be employed at the Bethlehem plant with
the seniority and re-employment rights they had acquired at the Elm-
hurst plant.9
The refusal by Glidden to recognize that plaintiffs were entitled to be
employed at the Bethlehem plant was a breach of contract. Therefore,
the court said that plaintiffs could recover the damages which the breach
had caused them. 5 The court did not consider whether the plant reloca-
tion was based upon sound economic reasons, although it did mention
the fact that the Bethlehem plant had more modern and efficient facilities.
Apparently the court felt that this factor could not be a valid defense to a
breach of contract action.
The rule promulgated in Glidden may, at first glance, be contradictory
to certain basic concepts of contract law. A closer study of collective
bargaining agreements would reveal that (1) parties to an agreement
contemplate a subsisting contractual relationship of indefinite duration
with regular renegotiations, and that (2) it is expected that the employ-
ment relations will continue beyond the contract's termination date.
Based upon this reasoning it has been held that certain rights arising under
an agreement including rights to vacation pay and severance pay survive
the termination of the agreement and are enforceable." The Glidden
decision becomes more understandable when viewed as a situation
analogous to one involving vacation and severance pay rights. Never-
theless, the case represents a bold departure from the rationale of the
prior "runaway shop" decisions, and as such, will cause employers in-
creased anxiety.
CONCLUSION
What the impact of the Glidden decision will be upon companies
that want to relocate is somewhat uncertain at this time. At least one dis-
trict court has adopted without reservation the "vested rights" concept
promulgated in the Glidden case. In Oddie v. Ross Gear and Tool Com-
pany," plaintiff-employees brought an action on behalf of themselves,
and their fellow employees for a declaration of rights, temporary injunc-
tive relief, and damages. " At the time of the commencement of litigation
93. Id. at 103. (Emphasis added.)
94. Id. at 104.
95. Chief Judge Lumbard dissented. Id. at 105. He would have affirmed Judge Palmieri's
decision in the district court.
96. For a further discussion of this point, see 61 CoLum. L. REV. 1363, 1364 (1961).
97. 195 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. Mich. 1961).
98. Apparently the suit was brought under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act. 62 Star.
964 (1948), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1958).
1962]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
the company was planning to move its plant from Detroit to Lebanon,
Tennessee prior to the termination of the collective bargaining agree-
ment. 9  The agreement contained provisions regarding seniority, as did
the Glidden contract (and as does almost every collective bargaining
agreement). The court actually expanded on the Glidden case, treating
its holding as a general rule despite the fact that the Glidden decision had
been based upon a particular agreement."' The court reached the fol-
lowing conclusions:
[T]he collective bargaining agreement grants the employees certain
benefits and rights that become "vested" in the sense that they cannot
be unilaterally denied .... [T] hese rights extend beyond the time limita-
tions of the collective bargaining agreement... [and] apply to a "plant"
regardless of the physical location .... [D]efendant has an obligation
to rehire on the basis of seniority those employees laid off. . . when that
plant's operations are removed .... 101
Whether other federal district courts will adhere to the reasoning of
the Second Circuit in Glidden is purely a matter of conjecture. One
factor is certain, the rank and file union membership considers the in-
clusion of seniority clauses in collective bargaining agreements to be of
primary importance." 2 It is unlikely that any union will ever bargain
away its members' basic seniority rights. And since the Glidden and
Ross cases have viewed seniority as a "vested right," these decisions may
have a substantial effect upon employers who want to relocate.
Besides being concerned with the "vested rights" concept, the em-
ployer who wishes to relocate must also be wary of the fact that law-
suits may still be brought under section 301 (a) for damages and in-
junctive relief, and that unfair labor practice charges may continue to be
filed under the NLRA. What then can a company do when it wants to
move? Unless the Glidden decision is overrruled, or the lower federal
courts refuse to abide by it, there appears to be only one recourse left
for employers. Once a decision to relocate has been reached management
will be required to exercise careful advance planning.' It will have to
99. The expiration date of the collective bargaining agreement was October 1, 1961. On
May 5 the company announced its decision to move the plant to Lebanon, Tennessee, beginning
July 1, 1961. The company said that all seniority rights were to be terminated on September
2, 1961, the date the plant was to be closed. 195 F. Supp. at 827-28.
100. The Glidden case concerned a suit for damages filed after relocation of the plant.
In the instant case the employees' rights were determined before the plant was moved. The
Glidden case held that damages were recoverable for the company's failure to recognize its
employees' seniority rights, while in the present case the court held that it would take the
necessary action should the requests made by the plaintiffs not be dispositive under the Federal
Declaratory Judgment Act. Id. at 831.
101. 195 F. Supp. 826, 831 (E.D. Mich. 1961).
102. LABOR RELATIONS AND THE LAW 604 (Wollet & Aaron ed., 2 ed. 1960).
103. For a discussion of the steps which a company should take when relocating, see
Rodericks, Advance Planning for Plant Relocation, 80 Mo. L. REV. 376 (1958).
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